《奋斗》台词集锦

莹石点评：虽然这部片子立意有问题，让一对狗男女最后走在一起，而一直对爱情矢志不移的米莱却下场凄惨。但剧中的部分对白和台词设计的确还是很出色。从华尔街回来的徐志森的思维方式的确与我们这些久居国内的人有层次差别。我敲了一部分台词出来，仅仅最后几集的。21集以前没有想到要收藏。

22集
米莱：陆涛，你这个浑蛋，这是你第一次为我哭。谢谢！

华子：语言粗俗，跟周围环境可不协调
露露：跟你协调啊

挨着个小树林就说是城市的绿肺

陆涛：我没想到你这两年是这么过来的
米莱：是的，你把我坑惨了
陆涛：那我能为你做点什么
米莱：买冰激淋，全世界只有你最爱吃的那种冰激淋口味
陆涛：还有你自己
米莱：我已经忘了，我连冰激淋是什么味我都忘了，我再也没吃过冰激淋
陆涛：香草和咖啡
米莱：我是香草，他是咖啡
陆涛：香草和咖啡一样两份
服务员：先生您要什么
陆涛：我说咖啡和香草 我说各要两份，我说我要两份咖啡
米莱：我要两份香草

米莱：不是这样的，米莱哭了
陆涛：把他们放在一个盒里，把他搅起来
对不起，麻烦你把两个放在一起，然后给它搅匀了
米莱：不是这样的，米莱哭了
陆涛：怎么啦
米莱：那勺
陆涛拿出一个勺给服务员：这不要了
另一个女主角：我就要个他们那样的

米莱：这是我的座位，夏琳不在的时候，我就坐这，现在送我回家，以前你经常不送我

米莱：以前你总坑富家女，你和向南华子一块，用尽各种方法骗我为你么付账结果我养成了一个坏习惯，就是愿意为你们刷卡

徐志森：有的时候，你一开始抓了一手好牌，你就不断的往上加码，这赌注越押越大，等到有一天你再翻开它的时候，它够好吗？新能源，绿色环保，人性化。谁关心它？没有人。人们只关心他买的那块地，买的那个房子，它会不会升值而已，就这么简单。

向南：你说你和露露都耗这么长时间了，都快把人耗成妇女了。依我看，这事就这么定了吧？你么俩挺合适的，别等了。
华子：这事也不能我主动，露露她主意挺多的
陆涛：她的都是小主意，你要坚决一点嘛
华子：怎么坚决？
陆涛：求婚
米莱：对，女人最喜欢的就是正式求婚了，我到现在都还没碰到过这种情况
向南：米莱，够怨的啊，看来某些人把你耽误的够呛啊
米莱：是啊，少女变大嫂，早恋变单身了，文秘变老总，一失足成千古恨
华子：恨谁呀？
米莱：还我青春
华子：欠债还钱啊，欠青春还青春
陆涛：哥们也有那青春，谁还哥们呀
米莱：还你什么也不能还你青春，还了你还拿出来欺负人
华子：说说 说说 我爱听这其中缘由
米莱：他，一副老实单纯的样子，骗得人家一愣一愣的，浑蛋一个
向南：浑蛋归浑蛋，人家米莱的青春得还给人家
陆涛：还你我还不放心呢，结果还不是再次上当受骗？
米莱：反正不再上你的当了
陆涛：那还不是一样吗？
米莱：不一样
灵珊：她们到底在说什么
向南：他们俩原来是初恋情人
灵珊：真的假的？

华子：杨晓芸的优点？
向南：白，通体白雪
华子：得，谁掉面粉里都那样

灵珊：我知道陆涛哥的创意
米莱：太贵了，这不是贵，这是昂贵，我怀疑他这是给神仙造房子

华子：你屋有绿帽子吗？让哥们戴会
向南：露露不至于
华子：太没劲了
向南：你说她能搭上谁啊？
华子：爱谁谁，向南，不是哥们吹牛。她这样的，就是一卡车一卡车往上冲，我都不带看一眼的。可怜之人必有可恨之处，我看她过了我这村，她还有哪家店投宿去？你说现在网上小姑娘一把一把的，她一中年妇女，就是大甩卖也换不来市场占有率呀。向南，你说吉普车不省油吧？她一纸糊的破灯笼她跟那儿起什么混？是假装浪费是怎么着？有毛病吧？
向南：别激动，别激动行不行？
华子：我有什么好激动的？我高兴还来不及呢。我车没油了，把你车借我使使。现在有一女孩子跟我磨蹭小半年了，我还撑着呢。今儿我非把这层窗户纸捅破了不成。

杨晓芸：就没见过这么差劲的人，今天说好了和我去离婚，居然在这种事情上放我鸽子，打了电话也不见人接
陆涛：我很焦虑，非常焦虑
杨晓芸：米莱，有我这心比还凉的冷饮吗？
米莱：有，我们这有最寒冷的
杨晓芸：太丑恶了，太丑恶了，这真的是太丑恶了
陆涛：说开发商的吗？开发商是不是东西
杨晓芸：陆涛你别打岔
向南：杨晓芸你听我解释行不行
杨晓芸：小胳膊够白的啊，跟鲜藕似的，你怎么不拉着胳膊把人给揪出来啊？
米莱：怎么啦晓芸？看到什么啦？
杨晓芸：我看到这个浑蛋给人家递浴巾
陆涛：太不堪入目啦，向南，你给人家递几次啦？给杨晓芸递得不算啊。
米莱：陆涛，有你这样的吗？还煽风点火的？
向南：君子坦荡荡，完全是个误会。一会你等人家灵珊出来，什么都明白了
杨晓芸：我现在就明白了，什么心碎乌托邦啊，完全就是一臭流氓的老黑窝。有你这么心碎的吗？
陆涛：杨晓芸，要不然你也搬过就知道我们怎么心碎的。
杨晓芸：滚
米莱：冷静
杨晓芸：我很冷静，非常冷静，特别冷静。向南，必须离婚，非离不可。这事必须马上办，我一分钟都等不了。我回去等你电话。

今天的事都怪我
今天的事和你半毛钱关系都没有

杨晓芸：呦，这离婚证是比结婚证难看，这结婚证我能保留着吗？
办公人员：当然可以，但是已经失效了。
杨晓芸：从今天起你就是路人甲我就是路人乙，形同陌路，井水不犯河水。

米莱：我可软了，这么摔都没骨折，换谁都不成
陆涛：我知道，你骨头软，头发软，身体软，心也软，却装出一副很硬的样子
米莱：你今天来就是要跟我说这个的吗？
陆涛：我有更重要的话要说。
陆涛：到现在我才知道，你是失恋了。而且一直没有恢复过来，我没有想到你的失恋会持续这么长时间，太漫长了，都几年了？没想到你这么能装。你喜欢这失恋的感受？好吧，这是一个必须要解决的问题，从健康的角度讲，这是种病。
陆涛：有三种解决办法：第一，去看心理医生，用催眠疗法，恢复你对自己的信心；第二，旅行，最好是出国；第三，移情别恋。
米莱：只要你帮我，我什么方式都愿意试。其实，后两种我都试过，全失败了，移情也移不出去，我就是想你，天天想你，老是想你。

米莱：谁也不知道你心眼有多好？
陆涛：那是因为谁也不知道我有多坏？

灵珊：人家说男人离不开女人，就像鱼离不开水一样
陆涛：可是人家没有说，离不开那一滴水哦

徐志森：我年轻的时候喜欢刺激的运动，去美国第一年我就参加一个射击俱乐部。刚开始我选了一把大的手枪，开始练习了，这第一枪啊，耳朵嗡嗡的响，连手都麻了，后来我发现怎么的？是因为我没有带耳机。后来我发现这些俱乐部里面的人，他们似乎都有一种愤怒，而这种愤怒呢，需要在不停的射击中去发泄。他们为什么有这种愤怒啊？我观察的结果，是因为他们被拒绝而愤怒。据我所知，在美国参加这种俱乐部的人，都是来自中下阶层的人，那个阶层的生活还缺乏回旋的余地，就好像在那个窄巷当中行走，不是进，就是退，你甚至无法转身。后来，我去了华尔街，在华尔街成功人士多了，各有特点。可是我的注意力没有摆在那些成功人士身上，我把他摆在少数几个失败者的身上。我就发现，这些失败者，尽管他们来自各个不同的阶层，但是他们共同沿用了一个特点，那就是小巷思维。不是进就是退，要么就生意成功，要么我就放弃。没办法啊，由于在这个小巷当中，他不是进就是退，所以很容易造成一种压力。这压力一多，就容易造成失控，一失控就离失败就不远了。后来我就想，这到底是什么把人推到这个小巷当中？答案是人们自己，人们总是想着用最快最好最省力的方法来到达这个目的，于是就不知不觉走到了小巷当中。

我想让你停下来看一看，你是在小巷当中，还是在一片平原之上。

任何时候都是有退路的，人们之所以走入死胡同，是因为他们没有看到还有别的出路。

我一辈子努力奋斗，就是为了避免对别人说这句话。我不说，也不许你对别人说。

陆涛：为什么我总是错呢？
徐志森：也是你是自我矛盾，也是你是太封闭了去妨碍你去了解这个成人世界的游戏规则。也许你根本没有错，是他们 错了。

米莱：你们问我，我快乐吗？我告诉你么，我一点也不快乐；你们问我对未来有信心吗？我告诉你们，我连信心是什么东西我都不知道；你么问我为什么喝这么多酒，我告诉你们，我很矛盾，我很不开心。有一件事我一直弄不明白，那就是为什么生来我什么都有却得不到自己最想要的。我尝试去美国尝试干事业，我努力投入积极的生活，我不想放弃希望，去为那些最重要的事情而奋斗。但最后，一切都失败了。你们没听懂，是因为你们不知道什么是最重要的，我告诉你们，是感情。

《左边》

米莱：这是最后一次一起吃。
陆涛：为什么这么说
米莱：我在下决心，我是在下决心，我每吃一根薯条时我都在想，吃完这根我就推开车门，离开你。你看，最后一根薯条也吃完了。
陆涛：我们去最后一个地方，你的母校门口。左转就到了。
米莱：右转，我不去了，我要回家。
陆涛：我一直在帮你走出失恋的阴影。
米莱：你已经做了你所能做的一切，没有人能像你对我这么好。
陆涛：没有人能像你对我这么好，这句话应该我对你说才对。
米莱：我们做了所有能做的事情，没有遗憾，我会记住和你在一起的日子，所有的一切都是真的，它有过很多美好。再见。陆涛，能和你在一起我很高兴，你去找夏琳结婚吧，相信我，我一定能缓过来的。
陆涛：我相信你

责任不是你应该做的事情，而是你必须要做的事情。

瑶瑶：以后我们还是好朋友，双人帐篷归你，双人睡袋归我。我知道你是个很浪漫的人，从一开始我就发誓，这一生一共给你三次出轨的机会，这是第一次，你已经使了。
知道什么叫大方？你不知道；知道什么叫正式范吗？你不知道；知道什么叫对你好吗？你也不知道。也许你知道了你就长大了，也许你知道了我就不喜欢你了。
向南：你对我好，你比我对你好。
瑶瑶：这哨是全世界最浪漫的礼物。
向南：那你那天为什么不吹它？
瑶瑶：因为我比杨晓芸对你好。

米莱父亲：活了大半辈子我算是明白了，什么事都不重要，就一件事最重要。一家人永远在一起。

我们去哪？
管他去哪
那些都不重要，重要的是我想和你在一起。

国家名称

1. Afghanistan [AFG; AF]
the Islamic State of Afghanistan 阿富汗伊斯兰国
2. Albania [ALB; AL]
the Republic of Albania 阿尔巴尼亚共和国
3. Algeria [DZA; DZ]
the People's Democratic Republic 阿尔及利亚人民民主共和国
of Algeria
4. Andorra [AND; AD]
the Principality of Andorra 安道尔公国
5. Angola [AGO; AO]
the Republic of Angola 安哥拉共和国
6. Antigua and Barbuda [ATG; AG] 安提瓜和巴布达
7. Argentina [ARG; AR]
the Argentine Republic 阿根廷共和国
8. Armenia [ARM; AM]
the Republic of Armenia 亚美尼亚共和国
9. Australia [AUS; AU] 澳大利亚
10. Austria [AUT; AT]
the Republic of Austria 奥地利共和国
11. Azerbaijan [AZE; AZ]
the Azerbaijan Republic 阿塞拜疆共和国
12. Bahamas (the) [BHS; BS]
the Commonwealth of the Bahamas 巴哈马联邦
13. Bahrain [BHR; BH]
the State of Bahrain 巴林国
14. Bangladesh [BGD; BI]
the People's Republic of 孟加拉人民共和国
Bangladesh
15. Barbados [BRB; BB] 巴巴多斯
16. Belarus [BLR; BY]
the Republic of Belarus 白俄罗斯共和国
17. Belgium [BEL; BE]
the Kingdom of Belgium 比利时王国
18. Belize [BLZ; BZ] 伯利兹
19. Benin [BEN; BJ]
the Republic of Benin 贝宁共和国
20. Bhutan [BTN; BT]
the Kingdom of Bhutan 不丹王国
21. Bolivia [BOL; BO]
the Republic of Bolivia 玻利维亚共和国
22. Bosnia and Herzegovina [BIH; BA] 波斯尼亚—黑塞哥维那
23. Botswana [BWA; BW]
the Republic of Botswana 博茨瓦纳共和国
24. Brazil [BRA; BR]
the Federative Republic of 巴西联邦共和国
Brazil
25. Brunei Darussalam [BRN; BN] 文莱达鲁萨兰国
26. Bulgaria [BGR; BG]
the Republic of Bulgaria 保加利亚共和国
27. Burkina Faso [BFA; BF] 布基纳法索
28. Burundi [BDI; BD]
the Republic of Burundi 布隆迪共和国
29. Cambodia [KHM; KH]
the Kingdom of Cambodia 柬埔寨王国
30. Cameroon [CMR; CM]
the Republic of Cameroon 喀麦隆共和国
31. Canada [CAN; CA] 加拿大
32. Cape Verde [CPV; CV]
the Republic of Cape Verde 佛得角共和国
33. Central African Republic (the) 中非共和国
[CAF; CF]
34. Chad [TCD; TD]
the Republic of Chad 乍得共和国
35. Chile [CHL; CL]
the Republic of Chile 智利共和国
36. China [CHN; CN]
the People's Republic of China 中国；中华人民共和国
中国的；中国人
37. Colombia [COL; CO]
the Republic of Colombia 哥伦比亚共和国
38. Comoros (the) [COM; KM]
the Islamic Federal Republic of 科摩罗伊斯兰联邦共和国
the Comoros
39. Congo (the) [COG; CG]
the Republic of the Congo 刚果共和国
#. the Democratic Republic of the Congo: see 48.
40. Cook Islands [COK; CK]
the Cook Islands 库克群岛
库克的；库克人
41. Costa Rica [CRI; CR]
the Republic of Costa Rica 哥斯达黎加共和国
42. Cote d'Ivoire [CIV; CI]
the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire 科特迪瓦共和国
Ivorian 伊瓦的；伊瓦人
43. Croatia [HRN; HR]
the Republic of Croatia 克罗地亚共和国
44. Cuba [CUB; CU]
the Republic of Cuba 古巴共和国
45. Cyprus [CYP; CY]
the Republic of Cyprus 塞浦路斯共和国
46. Czech Republic (the) [CZE; CZ] 捷克共和国
47. Democratic People's Republic of 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国
Korea (the) [PRK; KP] 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的；
朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人
48. Democratic Republic of the Congo (the) 刚果民主共和国
[COD; CD] 刚果民主共和国的；刚果的；
刚果民主共和国人；刚果人
49. Denmark [DNK; DK]
the Kingdom of Denmark 丹麦王国
50. Djibouti [DJI; DJ]
the Republic of Djibouti 吉布提共和国
51. Dominica [DMA; DM]
the Commonwealth of Dominica 多米尼加联邦
52. Dominican Republic (the) 多米尼加共和国
[DOM; DO]
53. Ecuador [ECU; EC]
the Republic of Ecuador 厄瓜多尔共和国
54. Egypt [EGY; EG]
the Arab Republic of Egypt 阿拉伯埃及共和国
55. El Salvador [SLV; SV]
the Republic of El Salvador 萨尔瓦多共和国
56. Equatorial Guinea [GNQ; GQ]
the Republic of Equatorial 赤道几内亚共和国
Guinea
57. Eriterea [ERI; ER] 厄立特里亚
58. Estonia [EST; EE]
the Republic of Estonia 爱沙尼亚共和国
59. Ethiopia [ETH; ET]
Federal Democratic Republic of 埃塞俄比亚联邦民主共和国
Ethopia
60. Fiji [FJI; FJ]
the Republic of Fiji 斐济共和国
61. Finland [FIN; FI]
the Republic of Finland 芬兰共和国
62. France [FRA; FR]
the French Republic 法国；法兰西共和国
法国的；法国人
63. Gabon [GAB; GA]
the Gabonese Republic 加蓬共和国
64. Gambia (the) [GMB; GM]
the Repubilc of the Gambia 冈比亚共和国
65. Georgia [GEO; GE] 格鲁吉亚
66. Germany [DEU; DE]
the Federal Republic of Germany 德国；德意志联邦共和国
德国的；德国人
67. Ghana [GHA; GH]
the Republic of Ghana 加纳共和国
68. Greece [GRC; GR]
the Hellenic Republic 希腊共和国
69. Grenada [GRD; GD] 格林纳达
70. Guatemala [GTM; GT]
the Republic of Guatemala 危地马拉共和国
71. Guinea [GIN; GN]
the Republic of Guinea 几内亚共和国
72. Guinea-Bissau [GNB; GW]
the Republic of Guinea-Bissau 几内亚比绍共和国
73. Guyana [GUY; GY]
the Republic of Guyana 圭亚那共和国
74. Haiti [HTI; HT]
the Republic of Haiti 海地共和国
75. Holy See (the) [VAT; VA] 教廷
76. Honduras [HND; HN]
the Republic of Honduras 洪都拉斯共和国
77. Hungary [HUN; HU]
the Republic of Hungary 匈牙利共和国
78. Iceland [ISL; IS]
the Republic of Iceland 冰岛共和国
79. India [IND; IN]
the Republic of India 印度共和国
80. Indonesia [IDN; ID]
the Republic of Indonesia 印度尼西亚共和国
81. Iran (Islamic Republic of) [IRN; IR]
the Islamic Republic of Iran 伊朗伊斯兰共和国
82. Iraq [IRQ; IQ]
the Republic of Iraq 伊拉克共和国
83. Ireland [IRL; IE] 爱尔兰
84. Israel [ISR; IL]
the State of Israel 以色列国
85. Italy [ITA; IT]
the Italian Republic 意大利共和国
86. Jamaica [JAM; JM] 牙买加
87. Japan [JPN; JP] 日本国
88. Jordan [JOR; JO]
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 约旦哈希姆王国
89. Kazakhstan [KAZ; KZ]
the Republic of Kazakhstan 哈萨克斯坦共和国
哈萨克的；哈萨克人
90. Kenya [KEN; KE]
the Republic of Kenya 肯尼亚共和国
91. Kiribati [KIR; KI] 基里巴斯
#. Korea: Democratic People's Republic of Korea: see 47.
Republic of Korea: see 139.
92. Kuwait [KWT; KW]
the State of Kuwait 科威特国
93. Kyrgyzstan [KGZ; KG]
the Kyrgyz Republic 吉尔吉斯斯坦；吉尔吉斯共和国
吉尔吉斯的；吉尔吉斯人
94. Lao People's Democratic Republic 老挝人民民主共和国
(the) [LAO; LA]
95. Latvia [LVA; LV]
the Republic of Latvia 拉脱维亚共和国
96. Lebanon [LBN; LB]
the Lebanese Republic 黎巴嫩共和国
97. Lesotho [LSO; LS]
the Kingdom of Lesotho 莱索托王国
98. Liberia [LBR; LR]
the Republic of Liberia 利比里亚共和国
99. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (the) [LBY; LY]
the Socialist People's Libyan 阿拉伯利比亚民众国；阿拉伯利比亚
Arab Jamahiriya 人民社会主义民众国
利比亚的；利比亚人
100. Liechtenstein [LIE; LI]
the Principality of 列支敦士登公国
Liechtenstein
101. Lithuania [LTU; LT]
the Republic of Lithuania 立陶宛共和国
102. Luxembourg [LUX; LU]
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 卢森堡大公国
#. Macedonia: see 170.
103. Madagascar [MDG; MG]
the Republic of Madagascar 马达加斯加共和国
104. Malawi [MWI; MW]
the Republic of Malawi 马拉维共和国
105. Malaysia [MYS; MY] 马来西亚
106. Maldives [MDV; MV]
the Republic of Maldives 马尔代夫共和国
107. Mali [MLI; ML]
the Republic of Mali 马里共和国
108. Malta [MLT; MT]
the Republic of Malta 马耳他共和国
109. Marshall Islands (the) [MHL; MH]
the Republic of the Marshall 马绍尔群岛共和国
Islands 马绍尔群岛的；马绍尔群岛人
110. Mauritania [MRT; MR]
the Islamic Republic of 毛里塔尼亚伊斯兰共和国
Mauritania
111. Mauritius [MUS; MU]
the Republic of Mauritius 毛里求斯共和国
112. Mexico [MEX; MX]
the United Mexican States 墨西哥合众国
113. Micronesia (Federated States of)
[FSM; FM]
the Federated States of 密克罗尼西亚（联邦）；密克罗尼西
Micronesia 亚联邦
密克罗尼西亚联邦的；密克罗尼
西亚人
#. Moldova: see 140.
114. Monaco [MCO; MC]
the Principality of Monaco 摩纳哥公国
115. Mongolia [MNG; MN] 蒙古
116. Morocco [MAR; MA]
the Kingdom of Morocco 摩洛哥王国
117. Mozambique [MOZ; MZ]
the Republic of Mozambique 莫桑比克共和国
118. Myanmar [MMR; MM]
the Union of Myanmar 缅甸联邦
119. Namibia [NAM; NA]
the Republic of Namibia 纳米比亚共和国
120. Nauru [NRU; NR]
the Republic of Nauru 瑙鲁共和国
121. Nepal [NPL; NP]
the Kingdom of Nepal 尼泊尔王国
122. Netherlands (the) [NLD; NL]
the Kingdom of the Netherlands 荷兰王国
123. New Zealand [NZL; NZ] 新西兰
124. Nicaragua [NIC; NI]
the Republic of Nicaragua 尼加拉瓜共和国
125. Niger (the) [NER; NE]
the Republic of the Niger 尼日尔共和国
126. Nigeria [NGA; NG]
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 尼日利亚联邦共和国
#. Niue [NIU; NU]
the Republic of Niue 纽埃共和国
127. Norway [NOR; NO]
the Kingdom of Norway 挪威王国
128. Oman [OMN; OM]
the Sultanate of Oman 阿曼苏丹国
129. Pakistan [PAK; PK]
the Islamic Republic of 巴基斯坦伊斯兰共和国
Pakistan
130. Palau [PLW; PW]
the Republic of Palau 帕劳共和国
131. Panama [PAN; PN]
the Republic of Panama 巴拿马共和国
132. Papua New Gunea [PNG; PG] 巴布亚新几内亚
133. Paraguay [PRY; PY]
the Republic of Paraguay 巴拉圭共和国
134. Peru [PER; PE]
the Republic of Peru 秘鲁共和国
135. Philippines (the) [PHL; PH]
the Republic of the Philippines 菲律宾共和国
136. Poland [POL; PL]
the Republic of Poland 波兰共和国
137. Portugal [PRT; PT]
the Portuguese Republic 葡萄牙共和国
138. Qatar [QAT; QA]
the State of Qatar 卡塔尔国
139. Republic of Korea (the) [KOR; KR] 大韩民国
韩国的；韩国人
140. Republic of Moldova (the) 摩尔多瓦共和国
[MDA; MD]
141. Romania [ROM; RO] 罗马尼亚
142. Russian Federation (the) 俄罗斯联邦
143. Rwanda [RWA; RW]
the Rwandese Republic 卢旺达共和国
144. Saint Kitts and Nevis [KNA; KN] 圣基茨和尼维斯
145. Saint Lucia [LCA; LC] 圣卢西亚
146. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 圣文森特和格林纳丁斯
[VCT; VC]
147. Samoa [WSM; WS]
the Independent State of Samoa 萨摩亚；萨摩亚独立国
148. San Marino [SMR; SM]
the Republic of San Marino 圣马力诺共和国
149. Sao Tome and Principe [STP; ST]
the Democratic Republic of Sao 圣多美和普林西比民主共和国
Tome and Principe
150. Saudi Arabia [SAU; SA]
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 沙特阿拉伯王国
151. Senegal [SEN; SN]
the Republic of Senegal 塞内加尔共和国
152. Seychelles [SYC; SC]
the Republic of Seychelles 塞舌尔共和国
153. Sierra Leone [SLE; SL]
the Republic of Sierra Leone 塞拉利昂共和国
154. Singapore [SGP; SG]
the Republic of Singapore 新加坡共和国
155. Slovakia [SVK; SK]
the Slovak Republic 斯洛伐克共和国
156. Slovenia [SVN; SI]
the Republic of Slovenia 斯洛文尼亚共和国
157. Solomon Islands [SLB; SB] 所罗门群岛
所罗门群岛的；所罗门群岛人
158. Somalia [SOM; SO]
the Somali Democratic Republic 索马里民主共和国
159. South Africa [ZAF; ZA]
the Republic of South Africa 南非共和国
160. Spain [ESP; ES]
the Kingdom of Spain 西班牙王国
161. Sri Lanka [LKA; LK]
the Democratic Socialist 斯里兰卡民主社会主义共和国
Republic of Sri Lanka
162. Sudan (the) [SDN; SD]
the Republic of the Sudan 苏丹共和国
163. Suriname [SUR; SR]
the Republic of Suriname 苏里南共和国
164. Swaziland [SWZ; SZ]
the Kingdom of Swaziland 斯威士兰王国
165. Sweden [SWE; SE]
the Kingdom of Sweden 瑞典王国
166. Switzerland [CHE; CH]
the Swiss Confederation 瑞士联邦
167. Syrian Arab Republic (the) 阿拉伯叙利亚共和国
[SYR; SY]
168. Tajikistan [TJK; TJ]
the Republic of Tajikistan 塔吉克斯坦共和国
塔吉克的；塔吉克人
169. Thailand [THA; TH]
the Kingdom of Thailand 泰国；泰王国
泰国的；泰国人
170. The former Yugoslav Republic of 前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国
Macedonia [MKD; MK] 前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国的；
前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国人
171. Togo [TGO; TG]
the Togolese Republic 多哥共和国
172. Tonga [TON; TO]
the Kingdom of Tonga 汤加王国
173. Trinidad and Tobago [TTO; TT]
the Republic of Trinidad and 特立尼达和多巴哥共和国
Tobago
174. Tunisia [TUN; TN]
the Republic of Tunisia 突尼斯共和国
175. Turkey [TUR; TR]
the Republic of Turkey 土耳其共和国
176. Turkmenistan [TKM; TM] 土库曼斯坦
土库曼的；土库曼人
177. Tuvalu [TUV; TV] 图瓦卢
178. Uganda [UGA; UG]
the Republic of Uganda 乌干达共和国
179. Ukraine [UKR; UA] 乌克兰
180. United Arab Emirates (the) 阿拉伯联合酋长国
[ARE; AE] 阿拉伯联合酋长国的；
阿拉伯联合酋长国人
181. United Kingdom of Great Britain 大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国
and Northern Ireland (the) （联合王国；英国）
[GBR; GB] 英国的；英国人
182. United Republic of Tanzania (the) 坦桑尼亚联合共和国
[TZA; TZ]
183. United States of America (the) 美利坚合众国（美国）
[USA; US] 美国的；美国人
184. Uruguay [URY; UY]
the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 乌拉圭东岸共和国
乌拉圭的；乌拉圭人
185. Uzbekistan [UZB; UZ]
the Republic of Uzbekistan 乌兹别克斯坦共和国
乌兹别克的；乌兹别克人
186. Vanuatu [VUT; VU]
the Republic of Vanuatu 瓦努阿图共和国
187. Vatican City State 梵蒂冈城国
[See: 75. Holy See]
188. Venezuela [VEN; VE]
the Republic of Venezuela 委内瑞拉共和国
189. Viet Nam [VNM; VN]
the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 越南社会主义共和国
190. Yemen [YEM; YE]
the Republic of Yemen 也门共和国
193. Yugoslavia [YUG; YU]
the Federal Republic of 南斯拉夫联盟共和国
Yugoslavia
192. Zambia [ZMB; ZM]
the Republic of Zambia 赞比亚共和国
193. Zimbabwe [ZWE; ZW]
the Republic of Zimbabwe 津巴布韦共和国

Very nice Song 《Savin' Me》

Nickelback《Savin' Me》救赎
电影《死刑犯》片尾曲

prison gates won't open up for me 炼狱之门不为我而开
on these hands and knees i'm crawlin' 唯有手脚匍匐前行
oh, i reach for you （感叹词我翻译不好）直奔向你
well i'm terrified of these four walls 围墙和铁栏虽禁锢我的肉身
these iron bars can't hold my soul in 却无法阻隔我的灵魂

/*****chorus*****/
all i need is you 只要有你
come please i'm callin' 我在呼唤 期待你的出现
and oh i scream for you 叫喊 已令我声嘶力竭
hurry i'm fallin'i'm fallin' 快 我正身处水深火热
show me what it's like 告诉我
to be the last one standing 谁能笑到最后
and teach me wrong from right 教我分辨是非
and i'll show you what i can be 不会让你失望
say it for me 跟我说say it to me 跟我说

and i'll leave this life behind me 我不会再那样活
say it if it's worth saving me 如果我值得拯救 告诉我

/*****chorus*****/
heaven's gates won't open up for me 天堂之门不为我而开
with these broken wings i'm fallin' 坠落凡间 我折断一双羽翼
and all i see is you 我的世界只有你
these city walls ain't got no love for me 冰冷的城墙没有爱意
i'm on the ledge of the eighteenth storey 我被困在十八层边缘
chorus
hurry i'm fallin' 快 我已奄奄一息
chorus

http://www.mp3-host.com/uploads/a18af.33a75.mp3

Oath

looking for desperation in life,looking for hope in desperation

用尽情感去奢侈，却不能换取谎言的终止冷酷人生，冷酷生活

i don't have enough time to keep an eye on this problem,and also no time to discuss with anybody

http://fallso.testren.com

hoping for the best;planning for the worst

Nothing can conquer love,but love can conquer everything.

How China's Propaganda Machine Works

How China's Propaganda Machine Works Joan Maltese Special for NewsMax.com Friday, July 4, 2003
It's the tail end of the graveyard shift in a newsroom in Beijing. Abandoned glasses of shrubby teas stand among the computer terminals, looking like biology experiments. As the on-duty Foreign Expert at China Central Television's English-language news channel, I am tapping out the headlines for the 8 a.m. broadcast, which have been carefully chosen and sequenced by the director and producer. As for me, I’m well versed in the verbiage the censor will require. Accordingly, I write:
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao delivers an important speech on how to continue using agriculture to build an all-around well-off society.
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Chairman Li Ruihuan says Macao has witnessed social stability and sustained economic expansion since it returned to the mainland’s umbrella.
Plane crashes in Turkey and the U.S. kill 96. That wraps up 8 a.m. I click the Submit button and go for a walk through the silent halls and cells of the CCTV-9 news offices, trying not to disturb the 50 percent of the staff who are sound asleep.
This is the headquarters of a national news service reaching millions of households in China, plus satellite subscribers in Britain and France, and Fox cable satellite subscribers in selected U.S. cities. The Fox cable deal prompted several changes, including expansion to 24-hour coverage, because it is a hopeful spearhead into the global media market. “Your first window on China,” goes our motto. “China’s best foot forward,” is the unofficial strategy.
You’d think the place would be noisy and busy, even with the graveyard staff winding down. Phones ringing, editors needling for an exact quotation, the director pressing the techies to make sure the links are up for a live interview. But not at CCTV-9 – not now, nor on the evening news shift with North Korea and Iraq both on the brink of war and the Columbia space shuttle just blown up with its crew.
With the exception of a handful of mostly upbeat field reports and the government-issue propaganda, our news all comes from wire services. Pull it off the computer, shape it to suit the party line, and shunt it off to the censor, at least one of whom is onsite around the clock. No communication with remote bureaus or foreign-based reporters, no exclusives, no contacts, no fussing with time differences, no pressure. It’s a good place to catch up on your sleep.
China Central Television is the state-controlled television broadcast service. It falls under the authority of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television and has suffered the attention of the Chinese leader himself.
“Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, yesterday called on the country’s mass media to create a ‘sound atmosphere’ for the Party’s upcoming congress,” began a front-page item in an August 2002 issue of the China Daily, the government’s English-language propaganda sheet. China’s media were so obedient to this call that what should have been rival organizations were giving each other plugs. “China’s leading newspaper,” began a CCTV-9 broadcast just before the congress, “the People’s Daily, will run an editorial Friday hailing the opening of the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party in Beijing. … The editorial also notes that the thought of [Jiang Zemin’s] “Three Represents” has provided fundamental answers to vital questions.[1]
To add another level of incest, the source for the CCTV-9 item was Xinhua, China’s official news agency. (Is anyone trying to scoop anyone here? Is anyone watching his rival’s every comma to expose untruths? Does anyone risk losing audience to the competition for peddling pap?)
Closer to the ground, it’s harder to tell who’s in charge of what exactly or how everything fits together. There is no organizational chart available to employees at CCTV-9, no roster or handbook or HR department or company newsletter or all-hands meetings or any other formal means of acquainting employees with the organization they work for. Language barriers in the newsroom go largely unaddressed. Changes come down from management like thunderbolts. The budget is opaque, although it is known that salaries for Chinese staff are routinely five months in arrears.
China’s Larry King
If you’re not one of our satellite subscribers outside China, you can go to cctv-9.com and watch our broadcasts to get an idea of why we’re here. China has opened up and reformed! Our news shows look just like yours! We have actual anchors who wear neckties! (Another channel, CCTV-12, has an interview set so similar to Larry King’s that it’s probably some sort of copyright infringement.)
One thing management has provided is a mission: to make our employer, the central government, look good.
That’s why “Your first window on China” always affords a sunny view. When a British tourist was murdered near the Great Wall, CCTV-9 knew nothing about it. When the police shut down all the Internet cafes in Beijing, our coverage never questioned the party line that it was for safety reasons. When Falun-Gong-hunting cops raided my hostel one winter midnight, putting dozens of foreign backpackers and workaday Chinese out on the street without a moment’s notice, CCTV-9 staffers were amused and sympathetic, but there was no coverage. When a group of North Koreans made a dramatic break into the Spanish embassy in Beijing that was played repeatedly on CNN, you never heard a word from us.
I went down to the Spanish embassy that afternoon in March 2002 and found Beijing’s small community of real journalists. Reuters, CNN, Hong Kong’s Phoenix, the BBC – everyone was there except “Your first window on China.”
When an enterprising intern who also worked as a translator and interpreter wanted to do an exposé on China’s woefully unsupervised translation and interpretation business, she was told to forget it. “Why would you want foreigners to know about this problem?” demanded those in charge. The irony seems lost on them that this method of making China look good is simply exposing the country as a joke.
So they’re especially stone-faced when someone within the ranks refuses to deliver the punch line. We had a business reporter exceptional by any standards who kept implicitly asking: “But what is China reforming from? Never mind all the self-praise for digging ourselves out; how did we get into this hole in the first place?”
When she finally quit CCTV-9 in frustration to work for a renowned global news service, an executive producer sat her down and threatened to personally ruin her career by informing every official and person of consequence whom she would ever need as a source that she was untrustworthy and shouldn’t be touched. When she wasn’t moved, she got a star’s sendoff. Several high-ranking executives wrote slurs for her personnel file and then made her pay a full year’s salary.
But it’s natural that CCTV-9 would want her under their wing instead of someone else’s. They study the foreign press, and they know what happens when journalists go legit.
“Influence on the rise—China’s military,” Ellis Joffe, 10/09/02.
“Annan: China Must Curb AIDS Spread,” Martin Fackler, 10/10/02.
“Tiananmen ‘Black Hand’ Chen’s 13-Yr Sentence Ends,” 10/10/02.
“Liberties in Doubt: Hong Kong,” Mike Jendrzejczyk, 10/11/02.
“China’s Changing of the Guard: Another murky leadership transition leaves the world guessing,” Melinda Liu and William Dobson, 10/12/02.
“In China, flood of fake diplomas,” Ted Plafker, 10/15/02. These entries appear in a weekly survey dated Oct. 15, 2002 of China coverage in the foreign press. It circulates among the executive producers at CCTV-9 and probably originates in the Foreign Ministry. The survey is comprehensive and includes neutral-toned articles on business, sports and culture.
No one to whom I showed this survey knew exactly how it was used at CCTV-9, but it’s evident that management is kept in the loop of the state’s monitoring of foreign journalism. Not one of these stories was ever covered by CCTV-9. When we want a lively domestic tidbit to lead a broadcast, here’s what we go with:
“Premier Zhu went to visit an organic farm in Salzburg, some 140 miles west of Vienna. The farm has an area of 38 acres, half grassland and half forest. Products made of sheep’s milk are the main industry on the farm.”
Footnote: 1. Yes, you read that right, “the Three Represents.” I won’t trouble you with an explanation of this body of thought, but I will tell you the Chinese Communist Party has pronounced it a breakthrough in Marxist ideology, which guarantees it a spot in China’s political catechism - see also the One Country-Two Systems policy, the Three Antis, the Three Direct Links, the Four Cleanups, the Five Antis, the Five Red Categories, the Five Black Categories, the stinking ninth category, the Ten Major Relationships, the Sixty Points on Working Methods, etc.
Part 2 in the "China's Propaganda Machine" Series. To read part 1 click here
It’s no surprise that our writers don’t know what a story is. There are very few Chinese over the age of 30 who do, thanks to China’s four-decade intellectual retreat after 1949.
Most of our writers are in their 20s and have no journalistic education or experience. But CCTV-9 offers no training for new hirees or interns and no rewards for initiative or self-development. Incoming Chinese staffers pass an English test that might consist of reading three sentences out loud, which starts them off as deskbound writers. From there, they can move up to directing, anchoring or field reporting. The third and final rung is the position of producer/censor.
Communist Party membership, highly coveted and hard-won, is helpful for the first two rungs, essential for the third. The executive tier is a sort of Mount Olympus populated by entrenched party members who have attained their status through sheer longevity.
The "Olympians" are our greatest obstacle to change, according to a consultant I spoke to who has been advising CCTV-9 on competing in the global media market. With virtually no experience as correspondents, no presence in the newsroom and no production duties despite their “Producer” titles, they provide no accumulated experience and no example of professional advancement. They have no standing in the community as professionals or achievers and no status outside CCTV-9.
They function mainly as two-way filters, tediously reviewing tape after tape of every broadcast and attending endless meetings at which they take directions from higher officials to pass down to newsroom staff.
It is said that they hate their jobs. One of them sadly remarked at the time the business writer departed that no global news organization ever came after him; he’d be lost in a real newsroom.
As prominent as these people are in the hierarchy, they’re devoid of basic management skills. They’ve established no system to reward quality, no program to recruit or cultivate talent, no channels to air gripes or disseminate information, and no chinks in the language barrier between techies and editorial types.
As for shaping a team, forget it. There are no regular meetings, with two exceptions, which I’ll get to. When I was first hired, I asked the informally elected leader of the Foreign Experts why our group, at least, didn’t meet once a month. He explained that management would view this as “organizing,” something labor is forbidden to do in a country whose political philosophy is grounded in workers’ rights. So story consults, brainstorming sessions, editorial reviews, and God knows what else goes on in a real news organization, are nonexistent.
Another gap in this picture is our audience. CCTV-9 has created no community of producers and consumers. I’ve stumbled across feedback (critical) in the Chinese and the Western press, but it was never discussed.
Because we get a free ride from the state, we don’t bother with money issues such as advertising revenue and marketing surveys. And because we haven’t done our homework in this regard, we function under the vague assumption that most of our viewers are foreigners living in China and Chinese who want to improve their English. Those outside China are assumed to be “affluent and educated,” because after all they have satellite television.
Where Ignorance Is Bliss
With the stakes so limited and advancement so unrelated to performance, ignorance and incompetence are not issues at CCTV-9. When one asks Chinese staff to clarify an ambiguous point in a story, the immediate and final response is typically, “I don’t know.”
We don’t do follow-up. We don’t do phone calls. We don’t keep card files or directories of business or political leaders. We don’t subscribe to any online information services except the wires. There’s a buggy database of our news scripts that goes back a few months and a room where tapes of the current year’s evening broadcasts are stored, but no searchable catalog, print or electronic, of our footage.
Lacking contacts, a reference library or an internal database, we turn to the Internet when we need answers. Because we don’t have the technology to bypass the state’s Internet censorship, we sometimes simply have to get by without answers.
It’s really too bad the Voice of America’s Web site is blocked, because we have no guide for foreign pronunciations except the BBC and CNN broadcasts we watch in the newsroom. (I consider our access to these shows one of the job’s best perqs, because it is an intellectual luxury in China that barely exists outside of five-star hotels and pricey apartments traditionally occupied by foreigners.)
Our business and financial coverage is especially blind. Almost no one who works on our “Biz China” has any notable expertise in business or economics.
I attempt to copyedit an item that refers to Chinese rural land ownership, which puzzles me. “Is rural land ownership legal in China?” I ask the writer. She stares at me in bewilderment. I repeat the question in increasingly simple iterations, and her answer is still a frightened stare. I don’t know if it’s because this 19-year-old business writer doesn’t know the answer to the question or because she doesn’t know what “land ownership” is.
In the end, the censor ends the confusion by ordering me to strike out the sentence. I’m confronted with an item on auction house scandals that concludes, “Christie’s escaped by being the first to give crucial evidence.” I want only to know what Christie’s escaped: indictment, prosecution, fines? When I query the writer, she responds in some confusion: “It says Christie escaped. He fled the country.” I consult her wire copy and get the facts. I’m too sober an individual to let the anchor say on the air, “Sotheby’s was fined, but Christie’s fled the country.”
Footnote 2: This situation changed a little during the Iraq war, when more people were tuned in and management realized we’d better improve our image. One day an executive producer dashed breathlessly into the newsroom and announced that we couldn’t use the word “coalition” anymore in reference to the British, Australian and U.S. forces. He had just gotten off the phone with “a foreigner” - credentials, profession and native language all unasked - who complained that “coalition” connoted to him, personally, a large number of countries, and that “allies” was the preferable term. That’s all it took to set a new editorial policy for our Iraq war coverage.
Part 3 in the "China's Propaganda Machine" Series. To read Part 1 click here. To read Part 2, click here.
There are a few things CCTV-9 staffers do need to know. These are imparted once a week at a meeting headed by an executive producer and attended by all Chinese staff who are not on duty in the newsroom. Foreign Experts are excluded.
This is where the mission of making China look good is hammered in, where Dos and Don’ts are handed down from realms beyond, where the staff is told what to cover and what to cover up. It’s a straight lecture session, no Q&A, no suggestions sought.
One Chinese writer surmised to me that it’s a repeat of what the leader of the meeting himself would have gone through earlier at the hands of higher officials, who in turn had it from even higher officials, and so forth. The overall message driven in week after week is that because we are broadcasting to foreigners, there is only so much propaganda we can get away with. Therefore, we should discuss certain of China’s problems and, crucially, show that China is handling them just fine.
That’s how a mass poisoning case in Nanjing turns out to be all about the party’s conscientiousness. “Authorities are doing all they can,” we lead, “to save the food-poison victims.”
“Upon learning of the incident,” goes a follow-up story, “leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council demanded the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and the provincial government do what they can to save the others. The victims have been sent to 10 hospitals in Nanjing, where over 500 high-quality medical specialists are taking care of them.”
The story does not reveal that 42 people died.
There’s another meeting, less regular, for the Communist Party division at CCTV-9. This is attended by those staffers who are party members, and sees action much more dire. The Dos and Don’ts are threats. Staff who have made mistakes are fined or otherwise punished. An especially bad slip-up and the party can get you fired. The most serious punishment of all is expulsion from the party, which means not only the loss of your job, but the loss of your career and personal ruin.
There were certainly no slip-ups during the second week of November 2002, when the Chinese Communist Party held its once-every-five-years National Party Congress, or NPC. This is the Chinese equivalent of electing a pope, marrying off the Prince of Wales or sending a manned mission to Mars.
You might remember the NPC as the week-long event that brought about the most recent leadership change in China, exceptional for its bloodlessness and unexceptional for its secrecy. Chances are good that you don’t remember it at all; Western coverage mostly consisted of journalists standing around Tiananmen Square telling a camera, “We don’t really know what’s happening inside.”
It’s therefore a tad difficult to explain the urgency and obsessiveness that set the Chinese media ablaze and sent CCTV-9’s writers, censors, producers and directors scurrying in all directions, hastening to change a word here or a comma there, imperiously issuing orders, and flying to TV sets with the volume turned up to the maximum to absorb every wooden minute of our coverage.
You would have thought it was a real newsroom, except that the propaganda reached such heights of crassness that it provoked some minor revolts among the Foreign Experts and served as the catalyst for my finally sitting down to write all this.
We’re talking about an authoritarian government with a legacy of tens of millions of murders that claims it has always served the best interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people; it will later censor SARS coverage after supposedly coming clean about its cover-up and establishing information networks on the disease.
Now, during the NPC, it is anointing its new elite, with the commander-in-chief of the Tiananmen Square massacre in the field of candidates and an unspecified intention to drag 1.2 billion people headlong into its latest political experiment. Imagine the kind of press coverage it’s demanding.
While the world was counting down to war in Iraq, the entire first block — not just the first story, but the first block — of every CCTV-9 broadcast was dedicated to the “profound historical significance,” the “major event not only for China but for the rest of the world,” the “significant landmark,” that was the 16th National Party Congress of the Communist Party of China.
What was so pressing and momentous? What was the story that so desperately needed to be told? Well, that “Delegates interviewed all spoke highly of Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents thought,” that “Serving the people wholeheartedly is the aim of the Communist Party of China,” that Chinese abroad “noted that as China’s ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party is praiseworthy for its ceaseless efforts to keep the country stable and prosperous,” and that “It was a proud moment for many overseas Chinese when President Jiang Zemin stepped onto the podium and began to deliver his report at the opening session of the CPC National Congress. The event kept them glued to their screens, their hearts beating in time with their motherland’s.”
If you’re not sold on the significance of these carryings-on then you’re in an insignificant minority, as CCTV-9 reported. “The CPC National Congress received congratulatory messages from world leaders including the Ukrainian President and the prime minister of the Cook Islands, as well as the People’s Party of Cambodia, the Labour Party of New Zealand, and other major political parties in various countries around the world.” Beyond all, “It was an open discussion of Jiang Zemin’s report to world’s media and delegates spoke open-mindedly and freely.”
Does management miss the unintended humor here? Do they share none of the feelings of the Chinese staff who write this stuff?
I assisted a Chinese writer in creating one of our regular digests of foreign coverage of the NPC, a cherry-picking exercise meant to show that the outside world was trumpeting its admiration for these obscure and undemocratic proceedings. It was something like the old joke about movie ads—you know, Critic X says, “It was a five-star snooze” and the ad says, “Five stars from Critic X!!!” The writer wilted as we surveyed our Google hits. Every reputable news service centered on the one topic we were forbidden to discuss in any of our NPC coverage, the leadership change. She knew no one would be convinced when she wrote:
Associated Press gave a vivid description of the venue of the congress.
The Washington Post said Jiang Zemin opened the congress by cementing the party’s shift away from China’s dispossessed, which are disappearing in China, towards its growing middle class.
Another influential US newspaper, the New York Times, said the new party congress will set a political and economic direction for China in the years to come.
Hard Core, Soft Soap
CCTV-9 is gonzo journalism compared to what they do at the Chinese-language news channel, CCTV-1. Their stuff is meant for domestic consumption, and it’s hard-core. None of this slipping in a few of China’s problems to sop a savvy foreign audience. Every word, every pause, every comma is carved in stone. Doesn’t matter if it’s accurate or complete or even logical.
Unfortunately, because it’s 100 percent safe, a lot of CCTV-1 content winds up in the English newsroom. We’re ordered to translate and air it, using the same video and natural sound. It’s only the Foreign Experts, trying to polish this stuff into acceptable news copy, who are irked that names and sources are missing or the rationales for new regulations aren’t given. Statistics in particular are thrown about like confetti with no meaning or attribution.
And with China’s population of 1.2 billion, you can get some pretty good raw numbers - quantity of cell phone users, amount of foreign direct investment - but it’s always up to us at CCTV-9 to do the math if we want to set the numbers in a meaningful context. Even if we try to follow up, the organization lets us down. Although we’re obligated to use CCTV-1 content, we can’t get their reporters to return a phone call or fill in their swiss-cheese stories even though they’re just six floors below us.
To worsen matters, CCTV gives all its press passes to CCTV-1, so we have to rely entirely on their coverage of such major events as a visit from President Bush or a ministerial-level news conference.
The exception is, say, the August 2002 visit from UN High Commissioner of Human Rights Mary Robinson; CCTV-9 was there to elaborate on the claim that she was “satisfied” with China’s human rights record (for the opposite view see any western coverage of the visit), but CCTV-1 wasn’t there at all and never uttered a word about the visit. Chinese viewers aren’t to be told that human rights is even an issue in their country.

Joan Maltese of San Diego worked for China Central Television. Next in the series: China controls the people by keeping them in ignorance.

这个老美在CCTV-9工作了一年多,发表了一些内部看法... 其实谁都知道, 中央台就是一个愚民政策的宣传机器...
一个美国人在中国中央电视台工作的感受--访前CCTV英语频道外籍专家琼·玛尔提丝 （按：琼·玛尔提丝 Joan Maltese 女士2002年至2003年在中国中央电视台为英语九频道工作了一年半时间。
在隒CCTV的工作合同期满之前，她记录、撰写了自己在那里工作的经历和感受。返回美国后不久，原文（英文）在美国Newsmax新闻网发表。据玛尔提丝本人介绍，文章发表后引起中央电视台英语频道的关注和有关负责人的暴怒。介绍玛尔提丝女士到那里工作的人也受到了严厉指责。本采访是此一前提下做的。本采访有所删节。采访中提及的玛尔提丝的那篇文章，有兴趣的读者可登陆Newsmax.com网站查找阅读。）
北明（以下简称 “明”）：您知道吗？你对自己在CCTV工作经历的描述和对在那里所见所闻的评价，听上去像是一个职业记者，一个媒体专业人士。我的意思是说，虽然您没有受过新闻专业的训练和教育，但是您在做那些您刚才所提及的有关新闻职业知识的调查与学习前，就?一种非正常的新闻作业环境感到不舒服，是吗？
琼．玛尔提丝（以下简称“琼”）：是的。我一直就知道我们基本上……我们没有遵守新闻记者的真正的，真正的使命。我总是知道这一点，从一开始我就知道，因为……
明：您自然而然就知道这一点？
琼：啊，是的。因为那里有新闻检查员，就坐在我们的新闻部办公室，是政府的新闻检察员。而且有时候我们写的最初的新闻稿件被改了。我完全知道。
明：您完全知道。不过您注意到吗？如果是中国人，甚至是中国新闻学院受过专业教育的中国人，他们在那种情况下也许根本不会感到有什麽地方不对头。
琼：啊，也许是的。我想是的。事实上他们觉得做政府让他们做的事，不报导真相而试图让中国看起来不错，是十分自然的事情。
明：所以您的感受跟在那里工作的中国人有根本的不同。
琼：是的。
明：您知道原因吗？
琼：啊，当然，你知道，我已经习惯于阅读西方媒体的新闻报导，我对这些媒体有一定的期待。我的意思是说，我的期待是，媒体是对所有人开放的，它不能站在某个立场，专门对政府作出回应。不仅不对政府作出回应，而且与政府是竞争关系，矛盾的关系。不光是站在政府一边，做政府让它们做的事情。所以，我对媒体的期待当然是完全不同的。很多我的中国朋友告诉我，他们成长期间，甚至当他们在语言学校里的时候，就被告知不能相信外国人，不要相信外国媒体，外国媒体在中国问题上撒谎。所以他们在开始参加工作的时候已经认为中国政府才讲真话，外国媒体不能信任，外国人也不能信任。
明：当您了解了这种情况时，您什麽感受？
琼：你知道，因?中国有12亿人。我全部所能做的就是希望某一天某些真相之光显露。我的工作可以改变一点这样的现实。那是我写出我的经历的原因之一。因为我工作是为这样一个……我是说我工作了18个月，真正是为这个宣传机器工作。这是一个不名誉的机器。就是这是原因，我决定我应该讲出真相。是的。我持续地希望，中国人对他们在青少年时期所接受的不高尚的教育变得越来越有怀疑性，对政府所告诉他们的话有越来越有多的质疑。
明：您知道有一些中国媒体专家，包括美国大学的或者媒体的专家，批评美国媒体。
琼：是的，是的。
明：他们说，美国的媒体在撒谎方面跟中国的一样：你们也不说真话，不报导真实的消息。但是这些人当中的美国专家并不真的了解中国媒体的表现。在您的经验当中，比较两方面的媒体，在报导真实方面，您有什麽评价？
琼：在这方面，自动地，当然所有的媒体机构都有人支援，都发表各自不同的见解、观点。但事实是，至少在西方媒体中有很多声音、很多见解、很多计划。你可以得到很多不同的故事，从而自己找到真实的资讯。更重要的是，在许多情况下，您可以自己去到私家资讯中心来源去找到资讯，找到，啊……政府在网上发布的政策、政策的声明，你不必要等到媒体把政府说了什麽这类资讯转达给你。你可以自己去找。而且，你有要求媒体报导真实情况的完全自由。你可以面对媒体，对他指出：你撒谎。诸如此类。在中国你就不能这麽做。因为媒体是，基本上是政府的代理。如果你到中国媒体去指称他们：你撒谎，你为政府歌功颂德，你立刻就有麻烦。另外就是，那里只有一个，只有一个声音。中国只有一个官方的声音。你得不到多重的观点，你的不到不同的多样的观点，那只有一个观点。所以中国人没有机会了解别人人怎麽说，别的可能的访谈是什麽样的故事。
明：比较中国政府对媒体的控制----事实上政府开办、媒体管理---您认为是否有可能，有任何办法，美国政府可以那样控制媒体？因?我们知道，美国政府经常遭受媒体的攻击。
琼：我觉得美国政府唯一可以控制媒体的办法是，不告诉媒体有关他们的消息。我觉得那是他们可以控制媒体的最好的办法。虽然如此，一些记者会寻找途径，找到那些愿意泄露资讯的人。所以美国政府最有希望的控制媒体的办法就是不让资讯泄露给它们。基本上我不认为政府可以真正地控制新闻。任何时候，比方说，如果美国领导人打电话媒体组织，给一个报导施加压力说，我不喜欢这个新闻报导。立刻，这事本身就会被报导出来。我是说，如果有人给CNN说：停止报导这个事情。 CNN就会报导说，咳，今天有打电话给我们要求我们停止这个报导。所以，美国政府没有多少机会控制媒体。我想，一个证明就是事实上，许多美国政府的官员经常抱怨媒体，抱怨它们的报导不真实。你知道，如果这种情况总是发生，总是抱怨它们报导不真实，那麽很明显，美国的媒体是不受控制的。
明：我记得美国打阿富汉的时候，布希对CNN播放了当时发现的本拉登的一个讲话不满，认为是替恐怖份子做了宣传。所以布希接受CNN访问时，希望CNN访问他的时间在长一些，以便他表达的清楚些，但是CNN说：不。你的时间到了，就这麽长。
琼：是啊。是啊
明：别说控制媒体了，你连被采访的时间有多长都控制不了。
琼：当然。你能不能想象，胡锦涛如果想要被采访，噢，上帝，CCTV1或者CCTV9必定放下所有它们手中的工作，落实这个采访。而且，在采访播出前，他将看到要播出的所有内容。所以是的是的。我是说，事情不像那样。
明：布希还抱怨说，CNN帮了本来登的忙，帮助他宣传他的恐怖思想，甚至那个讲话是个秘密战斗动员令也说不定，怎麽能够在战争期间，在这样的非常时期播放。但是CNN才不管这一套。照播。
琼：对对。是的是的。
明：琼，请告诉我，在您?CCTV9工作的时候，您跟那里工作人员的新闻价值观念完全不同，工作态度和方式也会表现在您的工作中，这种情况下，您怎麽跟您的同事打交道？
琼：啊，你知道有些事情，对于我对一些事情的观点，我们之间在许多无言的一致的见解，默契。人们，每个人都知道我们必须怎麽做。每个人都知道我们应该怎麽做。外国人憎恨的事情，中国人，我想大部分时间里是听天由命，他们就是顺从。有时候，私下里，我们聊起来，我们会提起某某人愚蠢，有时候有的中国记者会感到非常沮丧，但是大部分时间里，由于我们都知道我们在这里是生为一种宣传品，因为我们对此有共识，我们对现状没有太多的抱怨。现在，我们确实经常不断会有对政治的争论，比方中国共产党好还是不好，中国的对外政策是否正确这类话题的争论，这是一种每天生活中都会发生的争论，但是对于我们实际上做的事情，我是说，虽然我们外国人知道来这里就是为了宣传而写，中国人也知道在这里是为宣传而写，这确是一个接受的事实。这是一个不情愿地接受的事实。
明：如果他们没有发现您的文章，或者如何您没有发您你的文章，您认?您可以或者愿意回到CCTV去工作吗？
琼：啊，我不会回去为CCTV工作。我愿意为一个真正高尚的、积极寻求调查事实真相的媒体工作，而不是去?一个宣传机器工作。我愿意，我愿意回到中国去，我愿意在中国为CNN、或者美联社、或者路透社工作。我愿意味香港的凤凰、或者翡翠电视台工作。但是我不会回去为CCTV工作。因为我觉得我在那里工作了18 个月，我尽可能了解了那里的情况，那里的工作非常没有生气，而且对我来说也没有任何提升的机会。所以我不会回去。
明：您对我的中国听?或者你的在大陆的中国朋友还有什麽要补充的？
琼：有一件事我想说：我的这些谈话不是反对中国或者中国人民。我谈的是一些我希望中国人知道但他们不知道的事情。我觉得真的很难过，中国人经常需要到外国人那里才能知道他们自己的国家发生了什麽。而且我知道很多有良知的人、善良的人、工作努力的人，希望了解真实的情况，希望改善他们的生活，想要改变他们的国家，愿意成为美国人的朋友。我的文章是为这些人写的。我真诚地希望中国人，尤其是那些?自由而抗争、为了解真实而抗争的中国人，能够了解我的这篇文章的内容，了解这个采访的内容，感到某种鼓舞。能了解到，这里有人在为他们讲真话。而且，愿意就他们国家所发生的事情跟他们沟通情况，分享资讯。
明：谢谢您，琼。

富士的相机广告

没时间写blog，只好把一些签名贴在这里

i don't have enough time to keep an eye on this problem,and also no time to discuss with anybody